Rare earth elements (REE) are 17 minerals that quietly underpin much of the modern global economy. Found in everything from electric vehicle motors and wind turbines to fighter jets and semiconductor fabrication equipment, they are crucial to civilian and military technology. China produces nearly 70 percent of the world’s rare earths and dominates the processing industry, giving Beijing unrivaled leverage over a crucial component of global supply chains. China weaponized that leverage in 2025, when it implemented a series of escalating export controls. A temporary reprieve – a one-year pause on its most recent restrictions, agreed during a Trump-Xi summit – has offered some breathing room for affected industries. But with many other controls still in force and the pause set to expire in November 2026, the fundamental vulnerability for the rest of the world remains unresolved.
International governments and businesses are now scrambling to diversify their REE supply chains and reduce dependence on China. From Greenland’s vast heavy rare earth deposits to coal waste sites in the American Appalachian mountains, capital is flowing into alternative sources at an unprecedented pace. Western buyers are now willing to pay 15–30 percent premiums for non-Chinese supply, and multi-year offtake agreements with guaranteed pricing have become the new norm. Japan has urged G7 unity against China’s export curbs, while India is negotiating trade deals with Chile and Peru to broaden its sourcing options.
In this environment, Australia is emerging as the most important player in the global REE supply chain. Australia has the physical reserves, government strategy and private sector expertise to take advantage of the precarious situation China has created and position itself as a counterbalance which the rest of the world can rely upon for critical minerals.
Australia is naturally situated to become the next global REE leader thanks to its abundant reserves and technological expertise in mining. The country holds at least four percent of the world’s rare earth element reserves, including some of the richest deposits on earth, such as Mount Weld. This resource base sits atop a formidable broader mining industry: Australian mining accounts for 75 percent of the country’s exports and is a leading influence on its economy and living standards. Western Australia alone is ranked by the Fraser Institute as the top region in the world for mining investment. Underpinning this is deep institutional expertise, with government science agencies actively developing next-generation extraction and processing technologies for lower-grade REE deposits.
Australia is now seizing upon its advantage in reserves and mining technology to become an active player in global REE supply chains. The country is rapidly cementing its role through a series of landmark international agreements designed to route critical mineral supply away from China. In October 2025, Australia and the United States committed to a joint pipeline of projects worth $8.5 billion, with both governments pledging at least $1 billion each. Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi took steps to deepen rare earths cooperation with Australia during her May visit, building on Tokyo’s already substantial investments in Australian mining projects. Meanwhile, Australia sealed a landmark trade deal with the European Union removing tariffs on nearly all Australian critical mineral exports; the deal was eight years in the making. As EU Commission President von der Leyen told Australia’s parliament, “We cannot be over-dependent on any supplier for such crucial ingredients, and that is precisely why we need each other.”
As noted by The Lowy Institute in October 2025, Australia has significant reserves, advantageous regulations for private sector investment and numerous well-run mining firms. However, the country lacks the downstream processing and refining capabilities which have allowed China to corner the global REE market.
The Australian government has directly addressed the gap in downstream processing through its Critical Minerals Strategy 2023–2030, which explicitly aims to move the country up the value chain beyond raw material extraction. The strategy backs this ambition with concrete financing, including an A$1.25 billion ($890 million) loan to Iluka Resources to develop a rare earths refinery producing separated oxides of neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium. Crucially, however, the strategy takes a holistic approach: it simultaneously capitalizes on Australia’s abundant natural reserves through exploration support and geoscience investment, builds sovereign processing capability onshore, and establishes a Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve with A$1 billion ($712 million) in funding and price-stabilizing tools such as contracts-for-difference. The goal is an integrated supply chain – from discovery to refined outputs – that positions Australia as a reliable, non-Chinese source of processed rare earths for allied partners.
For international investors, Australia’s rare earth sector presents a compelling opportunity. Government backing from Australia and allied nations has substantially de-risked a pipeline of projects, while long-term supply chain agreements with the US, EU, Japan and others have created durable demand signals that provide a foundation of commercial viability.
Perhaps the most straightforward opportunity is equity investment in emerging producers outside the established majors. Companies like VHM Limited, whose Goschen project in Victoria holds over 413,000 tonnes of total rare earth oxide and has already secured environmental approvals and a mining license, represent the kind of pre-revenue, development-stage opportunity that offers significant upside. The US Export-Import Bank’s Letters of Interest to provide $200 million of financing to Goschen — and up to $300 million to Arafura’s Nolans Project — signals that allied government capital is supporting these ventures, reducing financing risk for private co-investors.
Beyond equity, long-term offtake agreements offer another mechanism to lock in future supply at favorable terms before projects reach full production — and Australia’s Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve makes this accessible even for investors reluctant to bet on individual operators. Rather than requiring granular due diligence on specific development-stage projects, the reserve allows buyers to enter offtake agreements through the Australian government, which allocates supply across operators based on its own project assessments. Underpinned by A$1 billion in funding and contracts-for-difference that establish price floors and ceilings, this framework offers institutional investors a lower-risk entry point into a sector where demand from US defense contractors, European automakers and Japanese industrial firms is intensifying rapidly.
But even with strong government backing and abundant reserves, Australia will face a persistent cost disadvantage against China. One reason for this is Beijing’s willingness to absorb — or externalize — the environmental costs of rare earth production, effectively subsidizing its dominance through regulatory arbitrage. As documented in the Mekong Basin, Chinese-linked extraction operations in Myanmar and Laos operate in jurisdictions with weak governance and minimal enforcement, keeping production costs artificially low while the ecological damage falls on downstream communities. Australian producers, by contrast, operate under rigorous environmental standards that impose real costs on project economics.
The most significant structural response to the Chinese pricing advantage is now emerging through price floor agreements. Lynas recently secured what is reported to be the first instance of a Japanese, Sojitz, committing to a guaranteed minimum price of $110 per kilogram for neodymium-praseodymium, mirroring a parallel arrangement Lynas is entering with the U.S. Department of Defense. These price floor agreements reflect that more than immediate commercial interests are at play; they represent a deliberate effort by allied governments and buyers to insulate non-Chinese projects from Beijing’s pricing leverage. For investors, risks can be mitigated through anchoring prices to contracted, government-backstopped minimums rather than being exposed to market pressures dominated by Chinese actors.
The overall picture for investors in Australia’s REE sector is cautiously bullish. Price floors backed by allied governments and major industrial buyers address the single most persistent structural objection to Australian rare earth investment, while the strategic reserve mechanism offers a more accessible entry point for institutional capital. Environmental cost premiums are real but increasingly offset by contracted revenue certainty.
Ultimately, execution risk is a consequence of commitment risk. Equipment sourcing delays, construction timeline slippage, and the long path from pre-revenue development to full production are all manageable challenges, but only if the government commitments and allied financing arrangements are followed through. If EXIM’s letters of interest do not mature into binding loan agreements, if strategic reserve frameworks remain unfunded, and if price floor arrangements prove too narrow to spur additional developers, then projects will fail to get off the ground. Investors must therefore continuously track implementation milestones of the industry’s major players to ensure that alternative supply chains in Australia are viable. It is the implementation of strategy into binding, bankable commitments that will ultimately determine whether a genuinely investable ex-China rare earth supply chain emerges, or whether geopolitical ambition translates into commercial reality.
Image: Shutterstock ID 2719425409
Maxwell Abbott
Maxwell Abbott is a Principal at Meriwether & Co., a specialist advisory firm helping investors and corporations navigate political risk and geostrategy across Asia-Pacific. He brings over a decade of experience combining political risk analysis, strategic intelligence, and on-the-ground investigations across the region, with particular expertise in Southeast Asia.
